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ABSTRACT: The Greek model of the Trinity, based on the Theological Orations of Gregory of 
Nazianzus, treats the Trinitarian relations as connections between the Father and the two 
other persons: the Son and the Holy Spirit. The two relations have to be heteronymous 
(“generation” and “procession”), and have to be interpreted from the extreme realistic posi-
tion. The Latin Trinitarian model, based on Boethius’ De Trinitate, treats relations as three 
subsistent persons. The relations have to be unidirectional: from the Father to the Son, and 
from both of them to the Holy Spirit. Both models are adequate and effective, but incompati-
ble. One of the consequences of this incompatibility is the problem of filioque: the introduc-
tion of an additional relation of procession into the Greek model as well as the exclusion of 
this relation from the Latin model result in the inadequacy of the models. From the point of 
view of the complementability of a model, the Greek model allows introduction of new ele-
ments, while the Latin model does not. The soteriological consequences are such that the 
Greek model welcomes a human person to establish a unique relation with the person of the 
Father, which leads to the theosis of a creature. The Latin model requires the saving relation 
to be established with the whole Trinity, and theosis is not supported. 
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The Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been a perpetual puzzle for philosophers 
for centuries, resulting in a plethora of theoretical means for rationalizing the unity 
of the three divine persons. In recent decades Christian philosophical theology ex-
pressed an increased interest in the Trinitarian problem, narrowing it down mainly 
to the opposition of “social” and “anti-social” approaches. The foundation of this 
division lies in the popular strategy of the 20th century to characterize Trinitarian 
theories either as “Greek” (Eastern) or “Latin” (Western), which is often called “de 
Régnon’s paradigm.”1 Generally the “Greek” theories belong to the “social” type: in 
                                                     
1 Michel R. Barnes has successfully shown that the so-called “de Régnon’s paradigm” has 
little in common with the original approach of Théodore de Régnon. See: Barnes (1995). 
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them the Godhead is considered to be a society of divine persons, and the main goal 
of these theories is to justify the unity of God. This approach supposedly has its roots 
in Greek patristic theology, and it is dominant in Eastern Christianity. On the other 
hand, the “Latin” theories start from the unity of the Godhead; therefore they can be 
characterized as “anti-social,” and the main theoretical problem for them is to justify 
diversity in this divine unity. This approach is usually associated with the Latin pa-
tristics and scholasticism, and it is prominent in the Western Christian tradition. 
This division has been fruitful, but it has its limitations, since the criteria of the 
classification (“to start from diversity” or “to start from unity”) are not precise 
enough, and it is not always self-evident which group a certain theory should belong 
to. Another weakness of the debate between the “social” and “anti-social” approach-
es is that the majority of the suggested theories are not strictly Trinitarian: most of 
them strive to justify any diversity in unity or the unity of any plurality, but have lit-
tle interest in the exact number of divine persons; therefore they have a limited ap-
plication to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. For a theory to be fully Trinitarian, 
it has to take into account the consideration that three is not an accidental number 
for the numerosity of persons. The most natural and traditional way to attach signif-
icance to the number of persons is via a category of relation, which plays a crucial 
role in the dominant Trinitarian theories in the history of Christian church. 
In this paper I will analyze two Trinitarian theories which contain the earliest ex-
amples of full-fledged “social” and “anti-social” models of the Trinity. The “social” 
model belongs to Gregory of Nazianzus (329–390), once an archbishop of Constan-
tinople; it is presented in his Theological Orations (Ors. 27–31) and became para-
digmatic for Eastern theology ever since. The author of the “anti-social” model is 
Boethius (475–525), the first medieval thinker;2 his model is developed in the treatise 
On the Trinity, and it became the mainstream theoretical approach to theology of the 
Trinity in the West.3 What is common for both models is that they rely on the Aris-
totelian category of relation4 to be able to introduce difference in God. Although this 
category had already been mentioned by earlier theologians to argue that the relative 
names “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” do not divide God’s substance, it was Greg-
ory of Nazianzus who made relation an integral part of the Trinitarian theory.5 Both 
                                                     
2 John Marenbon advocates the priority of Boethius among the medieval philosophers, 
and insists that “the ‘Opuscula’ [Boethius’ theological writings] are innovative in their very 
approach to theology” (Marenbon 2003, 4). 
3 Although Boethius was mainly inspired by “Western” Augustine, his theory may have 
Eastern roots in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa. See: Bradshaw (2009). Nevertheless, in 
spite of the theoretical influences, the authorship of the full-fledged Trinitarian model be-
longs to Boethius, while neither Augustine nor Nyssen go that far in their philosophy. 
4 There is a debate whether the Cappadocians borrowed this category from Aristotle or 
from the Stoics. Lewis Ayres, referring to the majority of scholars, believes that it has the Ar-
istotelian origin (Ayres 2006, 202, n. 502). 
5 As Christopher Beeley correctly states that “it was Gregory who made it [the term ‘rela-
tion’] programmatic for Trinitarian doctrine.” (Beeley 2008, 208, n. 61). 
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Gregory and Boethius agree that God is one, and the divine substance is one, yet 
there are three divine persons named “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit”; neverthe-
less, the three names that are predicated to this substance do not disrupt its unity, 
since relational statements do not say anything about the substance itself. This is 
perhaps where the similarity between Gregory and Boethius ends, since they vary in 
their interpretations of what is the exact meaning of the “relation,” and consequently 
they end up with different and incompatible models of the Trinity. So the primary 
objective of the present analysis of the two models is to demonstrate the crucial im-
portance of the nuances in understanding of Trinitarian relations, and the drastic 
consequences of variant interpretations which go much deeper than the “social”–
“anti-social” division. 
1. Trinitarian model of Gregory of Nazianzus 
The main goal of the Trinitarian theory of Gregory of Nazianzus is to support the 
divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Gregory’s model is based on the principle 
of “monarchy” of God the Father, i.e. the person of the Father is considered to be the 
beginning (ἀρχή) of the Godhead and the source of the divine substance. Since the 
Son and the Holy Spirit have the Father as their source, they partake of his sub-
stance; therefore each of them is the same: God.6  
 
At this stage this model of the Trinity serves two purposes: it explains the consub-
stantiality of the three persons and represents the monarchical order of the God-
head: the two evenly converge to the one,7 which distinguishes the Father from the 
two other persons. But this model is not yet sufficient since it does not provide any 
                                                     
6 The divinity of the Son and the Spirit is justified by the mere fact that they are from out 
of (ἐκ) the Father. About the Son: “For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, 
that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent” (Or. 29.10). About the uncreated-
ness, i.e. divinity of the Spirit: “Inasmuch as He proceeds from That Source, is no Creature” 
(Or. 31.8). 
7 Gregory illustrates his model by the phrase, “a convergence towards the One of those 
that are from the One” (πρὸς τὸ ἕν τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ σύννευσις) (Оr. 29.2, my translation). This 
convergence (σύννευσις, leaning or bowing towards one point together) is ascribed not to all 
the three persons, but only to those “that are from the One,” i.e. to the Son and the Spirit, 
who are from the Father. They converge back to their source, but not to each other. (The 
translation in NPNF “a convergence of its elements to unity” misses the point.) 
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means to distinguish between the Son and the Spirit.8 In order to compensate for this 
deficiency Gregory has to add more elements to his model: the Trinitarian relations. 
Moreover, it has to be two different relations, otherwise his goal to distinguish be-
tween the Son and the Spirit would not be achieved. A third relation is not needed, 
since it is sufficient to have “relation 1,” “relation 2” and no relation between each 
pair of the three persons to be able to tell them apart. 
 
Gregory calls the first relation—between the Father and the Son—“generation,” 
and the second—between the Father and the Spirit—“procession,”9 which corre-
sponds to the biblical, creedal, and theological terminology and the names of the 
persons.10 Gregory emphatically forbids to interpret the meaning of the terms “gen-
eration” and “procession”11 since it would not only complicate his simple and effec-
tive model, but would lead to the danger of erasing the difference between the “rela-
tion 1” and “relation 2” for the model to work.12 
                                                     
8 Gregory realizes this deficiency: “What then, say they, is there lacking to the Spirit which 
prevents His being a Son, for if there were not something lacking He would be a Son” 
(Or. 31.9). 
9 Elsewhere Gregory uses other words to describe the relation between the Father and the 
Holy Spirit. While the name of “relation 1” (Father–Son) is always a derivative of the verb 
“γεννάω” (to beget, generate), for “relation 2” (Father–Spirit) he uses different words with 
the similar meaning: προελθόν, προϊόν, πρόοδος, ἔκπεμψις (Or. 25.15–16), πρόβλημα 
(Or. 29.2), ἐκπόρευσις (Or. 31.8). 
10 “But the difference … of their mutual relations one to another, has caused the differ-
ence of their Names … the very fact of being Unbegotten or Begotten, or Proceeding has giv-
en the name of Father to the First, of the Son to the Second, and of the Third, Him of Whom 
we are speaking, of the Holy Ghost that the distinction of the Three Persons may be pre-
served in the one nature and dignity of the Godhead” (Or. 31.9). 
11 “Do not even then venture to speculate on the Generation of God … The Begetting of 
God must be honoured by silence” (Or. 29.8). There is a similar prohibition to the question: 
“What then is Procession?” unless one wants to be “frenzy-stricken for prying into the mys-
tery of God” (Or. 31.8). 
12 The same decisive refusal to provide any interpretation to the meaning of “generation” 
or “procession” is repeated by John Damascene four centuries after Gregory: “The Son is 
derived from the Father after the manner of generation, and the Holy Spirit likewise is de-
rived from the Father, yet not after the manner of generation, but after that of procession. 
And we have learned that there is a difference between generation and procession, but the 
nature of that difference we in no wise understand” (De Fid. Orth. 1.8). 
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Now the Trinitarian model is exhaustive. It consists of five elements: three con-
substantial persons—the Father (F), the Son (S), and the Holy Spirit (HS),—and two 
heteronymous relations—generation (G) and procession (P). The divine substance is 
not an element of the model, since it is the substance of the persons. The Father is 
the source of it, the Son and the Spirit originate from him, receiving his substance 
and therefore being the same as he is. The Son is connected to the Father by the rela-
tion of generation, and the Spirit by procession. The Father is different from the oth-
er two because he is the source, while the Son and the Spirit are different from each 
other on the basis of their different relations with the source.13 And there is no rela-
tion between the Son and the Spirit. 
It should be noted that in Gregory’s Trinitarian theory the two relations function 
as crucial elements of the model. They are some reality that is localized between the 
persons, some kind of a dynamic connection, a link that joins the persons together. 
“Generation” and “procession” are not localized in the persons, otherwise Gregory 
would have used the words like “fatherhood” and “sonship,” but rather they are ties 
that unite the persons into pairs. I am not suggesting that he turns the Trinity into a 
quintuplet, but his theoretical model is not reducible merely to the three elements. 
Gregory is able to discuss the two relations separately from the persons and to claim 
that they differ from each other. He is taking a realistic approach to the understand-
ing of the Trinitarian relations, where generation and procession are descriptions 
neither of a person, nor of the substance, but of some reality which takes place be-
tween the Father and the Son, and between the Father and the Holy Spirit.14 
2. Trinitarian model of Boethius 
Boethius develops a Trinitarian model which has a primary objective to protect 
God’s unity and simplicity, yet to find room for the three persons. Following Augus-
tine, Boethius uses the only Aristotelian instrument that allows introducing diversity 
without a division of the substance: the category of relation. Relative statements 
about a substance do not say anything about the substance itself. At the same time a 
relation always points at something else. Since God is called by the relative names 
“Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit,” there must be three relations that point to some-
thing else in the one divine substance. Apart from that, Boethius refuses to deduce 
any extra knowledge from the names, treating them just as the designations of three 
                                                     
13 “Inasmuch as He [the Holy Spirit] is not Begotten is no Son” (Or. 31.8). 
14 For more arguments for the interpretation of Gregorian relations as localized between 
the divine persons see: Butakov (2012). 
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non-identical relatives that can be located in the simple substance. Thus, in the Boe-
thian model the three persons are the three relations, which inhere in the substance 
without damaging its unity. 
 
Unlike Gregory of Nazianzus, Boethius does not introduce any monarchy into 
the Trinity, since this would bring an unwanted complexity.15 There is no subordina-
tion and no inequity between the persons and their relation is similar to the relation 
of sameness, i.e. the relation “of the same to that to which it is the same.”16 The tricky 
part here is that a Trinitarian relation does not refer to itself (ad se ipsum), but it 
does refer to the same (ad idem), which means that they are the same substance, but 
not identical. While Gregory of Nazianzus introduces the category of relation to dis-
tinguish between the persons, Boethius uses it to constitute the persons in such a 
way that there is no other difference between them except for the non-identicalness. 
 
Is there a way to identify each of the persons in this model without adding any 
extra elements to it? Boethius discovers the solution in the creedal formula: “We 
shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the Father, and the Holy Ghost 
from both.”17 In his Trinitarian model the relations of sameness have to be unidirec-
tional, i.e. not symmetrical. It makes sense, since we can easily say that the Son is the 
same as the Father, but there is some awkwardness in saying that the Father is the 
same as the Son. Thus Boethius claims that the relation of sameness in the Trinity is 
from the Father to the Son and from both of them to the Holy Spirit.18 That means 
that the Son is the same as the Father, and the Spirit is the same as both of them. 
Now the persons can be identified, since the Father is the one who the relation is 
                                                     
15 The triangular structure of the above illustration does not point to any hierarchy and 
has no specific meaning, but it will be helpful later for the comparison of Gregorian and Boe-
thian models. 
16 “eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem” (De Trin. VI. 21, 22). 
17 “ita cogitemus processisse quidem ex deo patre filum deum et ex utrisque spiritum 
sanctum” (De Trin. V. 46–48). 
18 “relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum” (De Trin. VI. 20, 21).  
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from; the Son is the one who the relation is to and from; the Holy Spirit is the one 
who the relation is to.  
 
Finally the Trinitarian model of Boethius is functionally complete. It consists of 
four elements: the divine substance (DS) and three persons—unidirectional rela-
tions—the Father (F), the Son (S), and the Holy Spirit (HS). Since the persons are 
relations, their numerosity does not complicate the divine substance, keeping it one 
and simple. The relations are like relation of sameness, making the persons equal to 
each other, and they are directed from the Father to the Son, and from both of them 
to the Holy Spirit. Unlike in the model of Gregory, there is only one type of relation; 
therefore there is no need to give this relation any specific name. Nevertheless, for 
confessional matters this relation can be called “procession” while keeping in mind 
that in this case “procession” is not different from “generation.” 
3. Theological significance of the two Trinitarian models 
So we have examined the two Trinitarian theories which were the first in church his-
tory to provide exhaustive and functionally complete theoretical models for the “so-
cial” and “anti-social” approaches. Their functionality is exhaustive since both are 
able to support the consubstantiality of the divine persons and their numerosity, and 
to identify each of the persons. Both models are simple and elegant, and both are 
Trinitarian, i.e. their structure is tied not to any number of persons but exactly three. 
In both theories these goals are achieved by an application of the Aristotelian catego-
ry of relation, although the ways in which the category is applied and the functions 
of the relations in the models are different. 
The two models became two separate paradigms for the later Eastern and West-
ern theological traditions until St. Thomas Aquinas made an attempt to unite both of 
them into one system in his Summa Theologiae. Aquinas allows for both interpreta-
tions of the Trinitarian relations. On the one hand, he speaks of the “relations of 
origin” in God (S.T. 1.28.4), which function in the same way as relations in the Gre-
gorian model that bond the persons in pairs. On the other hand, he also uses the Bo-
ethian approach to relations and insists that each person is a “subsisting relation” 
(S.T. 1.29.4). The combined model is cumbersome and less effective; moreover, it 
does not work without yet another distinction between opposite and non-opposite 
relations of origin (S.T. 1.30.2). It lacks the elegance and simplicity of the paradig-
matic models of Gregory and Boethius, and does not allow achieving more than each 
of them already does. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Aquinas’ theory; 
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nevertheless, his desire to use both models speaks for their value, and his trouble to 
combine them reaffirms their incompatibility. 
In spite of the fact that both Gregorian and Boethian models describe the same 
Trinity, use the same terminology and rely on the same Aristotelian category, their 
structures are fundamentally different. The model of Gregory represents a monarchy 
where the Father is the source of the divine substance; in the model of Boethius there 
is no subordination, and all the persons share the divine substance equally. Gregory 
makes use of the names “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit” to deduce the relations from 
their meaning; Boethius uses the names as mere designations of the three subsisting 
relations. There are two different real relations in the model of Gregory—generation 
and procession; there is only one type of relation in the model of Boethius, which 
may be called “procession” in the religious context. The two relations of the Gregori-
an model are indispensable individual elements of it; the relations in the Boethian 
model are not different from the persons and therefore are not additional elements. 
Gregorian relations are localized between the persons and characterize the reality 
that ties the persons together; Boethian relations are localized in the persons or, 
more precisely, they are the persons. 
I suppose that the problem of the reality of Trinitarian relations reveals a theolog-
ical weakness of Gregory’s theory in comparison with the theory of Boethius. The 
structure of the Gregorian model depends upon the existence of two different rela-
tions in the Trinity: generation and procession. It requires a position of extreme real-
ism concerning the status of the relations; otherwise they could not function as indi-
vidual elements of the model, and the objective difference between the two relations 
would not be justified. In other words, Gregory treats generation and procession as 
subsisting realities that are different from the persons. That means that God is one 
substance, three persons and two relations, which, I guess, is theologically problem-
atic. In the Boethian model subsisting relations coincide with the persons, and it 
does not lead to the multiplication of entities. 
There are other theological consequences of the differences between the models 
of Gregory and Boethius. They include the problem of filioque, the question of com-
pleteness of the Godhead, and soteriological consequences. 
(i) The filioque problem 
The problem of filioque has been a stumbling block between the Christian East and 
West for over a millennium. The difference appears in the formulation of the Nicene 
Creed, which in the East is confessed in the original 381 A.D. form, where the Holy 
Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, while in the West the Creed includes a later 
addition of one Latin word “filioque” (“and son”), resulting in the Spirit’s procession 
from the Father and the Son. Generally Eastern theologians claim that the addition of 
the filioque distorts Trinitarian theology and insist on its removal from the Creed. At 
the same time the West maintains that the filioque expresses a valuable truth about the 
Trinity and should not be discarded. Keeping in mind that the Eastern theological ap-
proach is in accordance with the Trinitarian model of Gregory of Nazianzus, and the 
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Western with the model of Boethius, it should be worthwhile to examine how the two 
models will be affected by the insertion or removal of the filioque. 
In the model of Gregory the relation of procession is the unique bond that ties 
the Father with the Holy Spirit. An insertion of the filioque will result in that the 
same relation of procession appears between the Son and the Spirit, since the filioque 
requires that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. 
     
  
    
It is clear that the additional relation of procession leads to the confusion of the 
persons of the Father and of the Son, since both are now connected to the Spirit with 
the same relation. Therefore, the insertion of the filioque ruins the model of Gregory 
because it can no longer provide a distinction between the persons. 
In the model of Boethius the relation of procession is directed from the Father to 
the Son, and from both of them to the Holy Spirit. If the 381 A.D. Creed is to be in-
terpreted in such a way that the Spirit proceeds only from the Father, then proces-
sion from the Son to the Spirit has to be removed from the model. 
      	
	     
 
The removal of the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Boethi-
an model results in the inability to tell the difference between the Son and the Spirit. 
Thus, the filioque is a crucial part of the model, and its loss will lead to the confusion 
of the divine persons.19 
So, the question whether the filioque should or should not be in the Creed de-
pends on the choice of the Trinitarian model, and the decision to change the Creed 
requires a change of the whole theological paradigm. 
(ii) The completeness of the Godhead and soteriology 
Another way to compare and evaluate the Trinitarian models of Gregory and Boe-
thius is from the point of view of their complementability, i.e. “openness” or 
                                                     
19 The model of Boethius supports both the filioque formula “from the Father and the 
Son,” and the alternative formula “from the Father through the Son” which was held by some 
Eastern theologians. For an excellent concise overview of the theological, ecclesiological and 
historical aspects of the filioque see: Dulles (1995). A thorough treatment of the history of the 
problem: Siecienski (2010). 
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“closedness” to new elements. A model should be considered complementable 
(“open”) if it can accept new same-type elements without a change in the other ele-
ments, or in their relations, or of the adequacy of the model. If addition of a new 
same-type element affects the other elements of the model, or their relations, or 
makes the model inadequate, such a model should be considered non-
complementable (“closed”). A complementable model is similar to a key ring: adding 
another key to it affects neither any of the previous keys, nor their attachment to the 
ring, and the key ring remains what it was and does what it was doing. A non-
complementable model could be compared to a pair of scissors which by its defini-
tion consists of two blades and a fulcrum. It is impossible to add another blade or a 
fulcrum without it ceasing to be a pair of scissors. In the Trinitarian context a com-
plementable model would allow adding another person or a relation, while a non-
complementable model would not. 
The structure of the Trinitarian model of Gregory of Nazianzus is such that each 
of the persons except for the Father is connected to the Father with a unique rela-
tion. There is a theoretical possibility of adding another person to the model in such 
a way that it would be attached to the Father with its own unique relation. 
     
	     
 
This additional person “Z” and its “relation 3” with the Father do not have any ef-
fect on the Son and the Spirit and their relations with the Father. Therefore, the Gre-
gorian model is complementable. It is open for another member of the divine socie-
ty: the Father hypothetically can be a source of another consubstantial person and 
have a special relation with it, thus turning the Godhead into a quaternity. In spite of 
its original Trinitarian structure, the Gregorian model has no internal means to re-
main strictly Trinitarian or to justify the threeness of persons.20 
In the model of Boethius each person of the Trinity is constituted by unidirec-
tional relations in such a way that the number of possible options is exhausted by 
three: the Father is the one who the relation is from; the Son is the one who the rela-
tion is to and from; the Holy Spirit is the one who the relation is to. A person with 
no relation can not be a fourth option, since for Boethius a divine person is a subsist-
ing relation to other divine persons. An attempt to introduce a fourth relational per-
son to the Boethian model will have severe consequences for the members of the 
Trinity. 
                                                     
20 Gregory himself does not provide any theoretical ground for number three except for a 
Pythagorean discourse on the greater stability of a triad than of a monad or a dyad (Or. 29.2). 
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Such an addition of the fourth person “Z” results in that each person of the Trini-
ty now has to be a relation to the three, not to the two other persons. Moreover, even 
if the Father and the Spirit remain to be distinguished as, loosely speaking, the ulti-
mate “beginning” and the “end” of relations, both the Son and the new person “Z” 
are those who the relation is “through.” The only way to tell the difference between 
the Son and “Z” is to introduce a new parameter: a quantity of relation, so that one 
will have “1 in, 2 out” and another “2 in, 1 out” which will result in a significantly 
different model. Thus, the model of Boethius does not allow adding more elements 
to it; it is non-complementable and strictly Trinitarian. 
Theological consequences of complementability of the models are such that the 
model of Gregory welcomes new elements while the model of Boethius rejects them. 
The God of Gregory can hypothetically have many more persons and internal rela-
tions, and our knowledge of the number of divine persons is framed only by the lim-
its of revelation. For Gregory himself the Trinitarian structure of his model is based 
on the orthodox interpretation of the Scripture, but not on his theological approach. 
His model provides an opportunity for an unorthodox adherent of the model to in-
troduce a new divine person.21 As for the model of Boethius, it is strictly Trinitarian 
in itself, i.e. it has internal means to safeguard itself from any additions; therefore 
any attempt to introduce a new divine person would require not only an alternative 
understanding of Scripture, but also a choice of another model of the divine rela-
tions. So, from the point of view of relational (personal) completeness of the God-
head, the model of Boethius provides a better approach to the Trinity. In the model 
of Gregory the number of persons is never complete since it always allows adding 
more, while the Boethian model restricts this number to three.  
On the other hand, there is a weakness in the model of Boethius, which the model 
of Gregory does not have, and it has to do with the problem of the impersonal sub-
stance. For Gregory the divine substance is the substance of the Father, and all other 
persons receive the substance from him. There is no substance apart from the per-
sons, which is not so apparent in Boethian model. Boethius approaches the Trinity 
starting from the unity of substance; after that he locates three relations is this sub-
stance that are identified as persons. Now the question is whether the substance is 
exhausted by the three persons, i.e. is there any impersonal substance left in God? 
                                                     
21 The possibility is more hypothetical than having a real historical background. Yet there 
are examples of a similar theology, e.g. Russian Sophiology of the late 19th–20th centuries, 
which came very close to proclaiming divine Wisdom as a fourth consubstantial person of 
Godhead. See Sergeev (2006). 
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The answer is no, but the model itself does not provide an obvious support for this 
negative answer. Of course, the persons are not parts of God, so a simple equation 
such as ⅓+⅓+⅓=1 is not applicable here. Moreover, according to Boethius, nothing 
but relation can be predicated to the substance to introduce distinction without the 
loss of unity; therefore there can be nothing in the substance but relations, i.e. the 
persons. Nevertheless, in the model of Boethius the divine substance is primary to 
the relations, and it can be discussed without even mentioning the persons, as if 
there is an impersonal god that is not necessarily Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus, 
from the point of view of the substantial completeness of the Godhead, in the model 
of Gregory the complete substance of God is enclosed in the persons, while the mod-
el of Boethius allows for a divinity that is not necessarily or completely personal. 
Finally a few words have to be said about soteriological consequences of the two 
models. In order to do that I will again exploit the notion of complementability of 
models, and will discuss soteriology in the context of establishing a relation with 
God. As it was said earlier, the Trinitarian model of Gregory of Nazianzus is com-
plementable, i.e. open for new elements—new persons and new relations. Each per-
son is connected to the Father by a unique relation, and the whole model hinges on 
the Father. Such a structure suggests the same pattern for a relationship between 
God and a human person, since, according to the complementability of the Gregori-
an model, it is proper for God to welcome new persons into relation with the Father. 
Having established a unique relation with the Father,22 a human person in some 
sense becomes a full member of the divine society equal to the Son and the Spirit, 
thereby acquiring a divine status. The theological idea of salvation as deification 
(theosis) is fully supported by the model of Gregory, and that is probably one of the 
reasons why is it so pervasive in the Eastern theology.  
But if deifying salvation is accomplished in a relation with the Father, what is the 
role of the Son and the Holy Spirit in it? If membership in a family is defined by a 
relation with the head of the family, the relations with other members are not signif-
icant to it. Nevertheless, other members can provide considerable help in acquiring 
and in sustaining this relation with the head. So the Son and the Holy Spirit, being 
benevolent members of the most excellent family, do their best to welcome and to 
support a new member, but, frankly, they do not participate in the saving relation-
ship, since the relations in the divine family can only be with the Father. As far as I 
see it, a major disadvantage of the model of Gregory is that it excludes the Son and 
                                                     
22 The same requirement that the names of relations Father–Son and Father–Spirit (gen-
eration and procession) should be different, applies to the relation of a creature with God, 
therefore it should also have a unique name. Among the traditional terms used for this rela-
tion are “adoption,” “grace,” and the most prominent in the Christian East, “energy.” Since 
the Trinitarian relations in Gregorian model are uncreated subsisting realities, the same 
characteristic is required of the relation of God with a creature. Therefore a decision whether 
this relation, the saving entity (e.g. grace, or, in the context of Palamism, divine energy) is 
created on uncreated, may depend on the choice of the Trinitarian model. 
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the Holy Spirit from the saving relation with a human person, leaving for them a role 
of external support. At the same time, a major advantage of this model is that it 
stresses the personal character of the relation between the Father and a human being, 
which is not so for the model of Boethius. 
As it was shown earlier, the Trinitarian model of Boethius is non-complemen-
table, i.e. closed for any new relations. No new person can establish a relation with 
any person of the Trinity, since all the three divine relations form an internal closed 
circuit. In turn, no single person of the Trinity can enter any external relation or 
start an individual external activity without a rupture of internal Trinitarian rela-
tions. Whatever God does outside of himself (so-called “opera ad extra”), he does by 
all three persons together. There is no way for a human person to have a relationship 
either with the Son, or with the Holy Spirit, or even with the Father himself, but only 
with the triune God. There is a radical difference between an external relationship of 
the triune God with a human person and internal Trinitarian relations; therefore a 
human person never becomes a member of the “inner circle” of the Trinity and nev-
er acquires a divine status. The model of Boethius has no means to support the idea 
of deification (theosis), thus a creature continues to be a creature even having estab-
lished the saving relationship with God. On the other hand, one of the major ad-
vantages of Boethian model is that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not excluded from 
salvation. To have a relationship with God means to have a relationship with the 
whole Trinity, to become a partaker of the fullness of the Trinitarian life, and not 
just of the life of one divine person. At the same time this inability for a human to 
have a relation with a divine person is also a major disadvantage of this model. As I 
see it, a relationship requires persons on both ends, while according to the model of 
Boethius a human person can only have a relationship with God, i.e. with the divine 
substance. Even if we relate to God as a Trinity of persons, this Boethian Trinity is a 
closed and non-complementable community. For Boethius the Trinitarian persons 
are defined only by their mutual relations, so it is not clear how they can participate 
in any other relationship but with themselves. As a believer seeking personal rela-
tionship with God, I have a hard time understanding a relationship either with a 
substance or with a closed community of persons that do not relate to me. 
To summarize the soteriological differences between the two models it can be 
said that neither of them is definitely better then the other. Each model has its bene-
fits and weaknesses. In the complementable model of Gregory a human person is 
welcome to establish a relationship with the person of the Father; in the non-
complementable model of Boethius the relationship is established with the triune 
God. The Gregorian model supports the idea of theosis; therefore salvation is under-
stood as rising above the creaturely status and becoming divine, while the Boethian 
model does not provide any means for human deification. According to the model of 
Gregory, the Son and the Holy Spirit do not directly participate in the relationship 
with the human person, while the model of Boethius necessitates the participation of 
the whole Trinity in this relationship. Finally, the model of Gregory emphasizes a 
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personal character of the salutary relationship with God, which is not so for the 
model of Boethius.  
4. Conclusion 
I hope that the present analysis of the Trinitarian models of Gregory of Nazianzus 
and Boethius is sufficient to demonstrate the vital importance of an application of 
the category of relation to Trinitarian theories. Moreover, the nuances of this appli-
cation have much deeper theoretical and theological consequences than “social”–
“anti-social” requirements of “starting from diversity” or “from unity.” The actual 
dividing line between Eastern and Western Trinitarian traditions seems to be rooted 
in their understandings of the Trinitarian relations, whether these are a reality that 
connects the divine persons, or they are the persons themselves. Of course, the theo-
ries of Gregory and Boethius lack the philosophical depth and subtlety of modern 
Trinitarian projects; on the other hand, they provide full-fledged and adequate mod-
els of the Trinity, while modern philosophical theology is mostly concerned only 
with the unity vs. diversity problem. I hope that this paper will motivate contempo-
rary philosophers and theologians to reconsider their approaches to the Trinity in 
the light of the Trinitarian relations. 
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